Robinson (2023) “Tax Aversion and the Social Contract in Africa”. Journal of African Economies.
Abstract: Despite the low levels of taxation and public good provision in Africa, I provide evidence that a large proportion of Africans prefer lower taxation and fewer public goods. This cannot be explained by standard arguments about problems of accountability, governance or state capacity. Instead, I argue that it reflects deeply seated ideas about the nature of the state and its potential threats to the autonomy of society. I show the historic social contracts in Africa rarely featured taxation and kept the state to limited jurisdictions. These social contracts have in many ways reproduced themselves and influence the way Africa is governed today
Heldring & Robinson (2023). “Problematizing state capacity: the Rwandan case.” Journal of Institutional Economics.
Abstract: We argue that the effectiveness of Rwandan governments, both at implementing the 1994 genocide and inducing the current growth miracle, illustrates that the state has high capacity. Yet this capacity is not captured by conventional Weberian concepts, with their focus on taxation and formal bureaucracy. Rather, the capacity of Rwanda’s state relies on its ability to leverage dense social networks which connect it to society. The origins of these networks lie in the construction of the historical state which expanded by merging with local lineages and kinship groups. Using data on the historical expansion of the Rwandan state as a proxy for the strength of state–society social networks we show they are uncorrelated with measures of Weberian state capacity. In a fieldwork exercise, we show that rule compliance today is positively correlated with our proxy, but uncorrelated with Weberian state capacity.
Jeppesen, Bak & Kjær (2023) “Conceptualizing the fiscal state: implications for sub-Saharan Africa” Journal of Institutional Economics.
Abstract: This paper contributes to the debate on domestic revenue mobilization and state-building in the Global South by exploring the concept of fiscal states and the common assumption that such states are present in sub-Saharan Africa. We systematically review the diverse understandings of the fiscal state across relevant literatures to revisit its conceptualization. On that basis, we define the fiscal state as a state whose public revenue base is dominated by tax revenue and loans, and where the relationship between taxation and external and domestic borrowing is balanced and thereby sustainable and characterized by interdependence. We distinguish the fiscal state conceptually from the tax, debt, and rentier states and present a typology of these ideal state types, discussing illustrative empirical examples of different states in sub-Saharan Africa. These illustrate that not all sub-Saharan states can be categorized as fiscal states. This is important because when African states are regarded as fiscal states, assumptions are made about their economic structures; yet, to the extent that these are absent, fiscal policy reforms are unlikely to carry long-term positive effects.